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The Breakfast Theory of Jurisprudence
By WILLARD L. KING*

YOUR

(Reprinted from Chicago Bar Record November, 1936)

librarian has tried to find escape from political

oratory and the summer's heat by rereading Warren's
"'History of the Supreme Court of the United States."
Since that work appeared in 1923, our Supreme Court
has passed through one of the most eventful periods of its
history. The Minnesota Moratorium case, the Gold Clause
case, the Railroad Pension case, and the N. R. A. and A. A. A.
cases have thrown a bright light of publicity upon its work.
One theory that is dinned into the public mind by the
current newspapers and magazines, and even by some college
professors, is that a study of the politics and personalityyes, even of the comparative personal wealth-of the judges
who now sit upon that court is of more importance in predicting their decisions than an examination of the Constitution or of the law governing its interpretation.
This has been called "the breakfast theory of jurisprudence," as though momentous decisions were dependent
upon what a judge ate at breakfast. A Freudian touch frequently appears in such analyses of the judge's character. In
reply someone has suggested that if this theory prevails, the
time may come when Twiss's story of Lord Eldon's senile
laughter on seeing his servant girls strive not to show their
legs as they descended the ladders during the fire at his castle
may, in years to come, be cited on a parity with his judicial
opinions.
We hear much of the Baptist parsonage as the background of the Chief Justice's judicial opinions or of the
Oriental cast of Judge Cardozo's thought. We hear of
"ultra capitalistic leanings," "the predominance of Republicans upon the federal bench;" we hear of liberal judges and
conservative judges. We hear that the process of judicial
interpretation of the Constitution is legislative rather than
judicial, and that expert economists would be better fitted
than lawyers to perform it. But we hear little or nothing of
the Constitution which is being interpreted or of the great
body of constitutional doctrines by which such interpretations are made.
*Of the Chicago Bar.
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Warren's "History of the Supreme Court" is an excellent
antidote for this mis-emphasis. From it, a devastating brief
could be written in opposition to the "breakfast theory."
The decisions of men appointed to that bench for political
reasons have been a crushing disappointment to their sponsors.
The court has been violently nonpartisan, unless one counts
partisanship for the Constitution as a fault. Many times
its decisions have thwarted the cherished designs of the President who appointed the judge rendering the decision. Many
judges have concurred in decisions permitting action contrary
to their own deepest political philosophy.
In 1804, at the height of his controversy with the court,
Jefferson had his first opportunity to fill a vacancy. Gallatin
wrote the President, "The importance of filling this vacancy
with a Republican and a man of sufficient talents to be useful
Jefferson appointed William Johnson, a stalis obvious."
wart Republican.
A few years later, in Jefferson's great battle to enforce
the Embargo Act over the fighting protest of the New England states, he instructed the collectors of all ports to detain
all vessels loaded with provisions regardless of their alleged
destination. It was then Mr. Justice Johnson who issued
a mandamus to the collector of the port of Charleston to allow
clearance of a vessel loaded with rice and bound for Baltimore.
Justice Johnson held Jefferson's instructions to the collector
to have been illegal and unwarranted by the statute. Warren says:
"And this young Republican Judge, then only
thirty-six years old, and only four years after his appointment on the Supreme Bench by a Republican
President, used these notable words of warning from the
Judiciary to the President: 'The officers of our government from the highest to the lowest are equally subject
to legal restraints.' "
Perhaps the climax of Jefferson's party's war with the
court came in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, on the question of whether in a criminal case the Supreme Court could
issue its writ of error in which the Commonwealth of Virginia, at the instance of Cohens, was "cited and admonished
to be and appear at the Supreme Court of the United States."
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Feeling ran high. The Richmond Enquirer said, "The very
title of the case is enough to stir one's blood."
Mr. Justice
Johnson, much to Jefferson's disgust, joined with his brethren
on the bench to sustain the jurisdiction of the court. Eleven
days later Justice Johnson delivered the opinion in McClurg
v. Tilliman, 6 Wheat. 598, denying the right of a state court
to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal official. The Richmond Enquirer then said, "Was this Judge one of those who
formerly passed for a Republican? Was he raised to the
Bench by Thomas Jefferson on account of his reputed attachment to the principles of '98 and '99?"
And so has it always been. President Jackson appointed five new Justices, including a new Chief Justice.
The
Democratic Review said in 1838, "The late renovation of the
constitution of this august body, by the creation of seven of
the nine members under the auspices of the present Democratic
ascendancy, may be regarded as the closing of an old and the
opening of a new era in its history."
But no new era opened
in the way that the Democrats hoped. The doughty General
in the White House was soon sending for his appointees and
berating them for their opinions. The new Chief Justice
(Taney) rendered the opinion of the court in Holmes v.
Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, upholding the exclusive authority of
the Federal Government in foreign relations and denying the
power of a state to surrender to a foreign nation a fugitive
criminal.
Thereupon, his Democratic brother, James
Buchanan, said in the United States Senate, "I must say, and
I am sorry in my very heart to say it, that some portions of
his opinion in the case are latitudinous and centralizing beyond anything I have ever read in any other judicial opinion."
Again, when Judge Story held the Pennsylvania Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16
Peters 539, Warren reports:
"For his part in the 'ignoble compliance with the
slaveholders' will' Judge Story was hotly assailed at
the North; but such criticism could not perturb a Judge
who had penned to a friend the following noble words:
.. . You know full well that I have ever been opposed
to slavery. But I take my standard of duty as a Judge
from the Constitution.' "
.
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In the forties a case full of political dynamite came before the new Democratic Court. The Democratic or Loco
Foco party enthusiastically supported Thomas W. Dorr of
Rhode Island in the Dorr rebellion. In Rhode Island he was
convicted and imprisoned for treason. His cause became distinctly a party issue. The Supreme Court, after prolonged
argument amidst intense political excitement, refused to interfere. .Warren says, "By this decision, the Court ... proved
its determination to withstand appeals to any partisan views
which it might be supposed to hold."
Again, in the sixties, President Lincoln appointed a
majority of the court-among them his dear personal friend,
David Davis. And it was David Davis who delivered the
opinion of the court in Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, holding
Lincoln's military courts illegal and their action void. The
National Intelligencer said, "The hearts of traitors will be
glad by the announcement that treason, vanquished upon
the battlefield and hunted from every other retreat, has at last
found a secure shelter in the bosom of the Supreme Court."
But are there not decisions of the Supreme Court on
strict party lines? Yes. In the eighteen years of Chief
Justice Fuller's regime (1892-1910) there was one, and
only one, such decision. In that case (Snyder v. Bettman,
190 U. S. 249) by a strict party vote the court held that the
federal estate tax could be collected on a bequest to the municipality. As Warren points out, the decision will not become of great importance "until the people of the United
States have become far more eager to make bequests to municipalities than they are today."
Certainly the division on
party lines was wholly 'fortuitous.
Warren summarizes:
"Time and time again it has been proved-and to
the great honor of the profession-that no lawyer,
whose character and legal ability would warrant his appointment to that lofty tribunal, would stoop to smirch
his own record by submitting his judgment to the political touchstone; and no President has dared to appoint
to that Court a lawyer whose character and ability
would not meet the test."

